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GENETIC TESTING AND TESTIMONY IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION:
"ADMISSIBILITY AND EVALUATION"
Jennifer M. Champagne*
Official guidelines must be promulgated in order to assist with
case-by-case judicial admissibility determinations of genetic
testing evidence in toxic tort litigation. Emerging technology,
specifically advancements in genetic testing, could prove highly
influential in toxic tort litigation. Genetic testing data can, in
many cases, provide evidence of both (i) proof of exposure to a
toxic substance and (ii) proof of genetic susceptibility of an
individual plaintiff to a specific illness. Thus, genetic testing data
may be helpful in proving an individual plaintiff's exposure to the
alleged toxic substance, as well as in establishing or disproving
the plaintiffs genetic susceptibility to illness alleged to have
resulted from exposure to said toxic substance. As such, genetic
testing data could have a drastic impact on a jury's causation
analysis in toxic tort litigation. It is imperative that such evidence
be admitted only where there is clear scientific significance of the
evidence in question and the impact of such data can be
sufficiently explained to the jury. This article proposes that formal
guidelines be promulgated to ensure the probative value of genetic
testing evidence and testimony in toxic tort litigation is properly
weighed against the potential harm such evidence poses to
individual plaintiffs and defendants, as well as the potential of the
evidence to confuse the jury's causation analysis.
* Jennifer M. Champagne is an associate at Dervishi, Levine & Morgan, P.C.
in New York City. She received her J.D. from Seton Hall University School of
Law with a concentration in intellectual property and her B.A. in Biology from
Hollins University. The author wishes to thank her family and friends for their
support and encouragement, Professor Gaia Bernstein for her invaluable
guidance, and LaFave, Wein & Frament, PLLC for their support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Proof of causation in toxic tort litigation remains one of the
most challenging hurdles for plaintiffs to overcome, as plaintiffs
must prove actual exposure to the alleged toxic substance as well
as specific causation of plaintiffs injury, disease, or health
ailment.' The potential presence of numerous disease-causing
toxic substances in our everyday lives leads to uncertainties in
determining which, if any, substance the plaintiff was exposed to
and if that substance is the cause of the plaintiffs illness.2 Given
these uncertainties, the field of toxic tort litigation is a prime
candidate for the use of emerging genetic testing to facilitate the
analysis of causation.3 Genetic data most relevant to toxic tort
litigation can be broken down into two main groups. The first
group includes "inherited genetic variations that affect an
individual's susceptibility to disease as a result of toxic
exposures," and the second group includes "genetic changes that
occur in individual cells as a result of toxic exposures during the
person's lifetime."' The second group of relevant genetic data
includes cellular changes that represent genetic mutations not
generally inherited by future generations; however, they can act as
unique biomarkers of exposure and can indicate exposure to
specific toxic substances.' The way each individual responds to
toxic substance exposure may vary as a result of a person's unique
1 See Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. &
POL'Y 7, 9 (2006).
2 See id.
' See id.
4 Gary E. Marchant, Genetics in the Courtroom: Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31
SETON HALL L. REv. 949, 949-50 (2001).
5 See id.; Marchant, supra note 1, at 18-19 (explaining that biomarkers are
genetic changes in an individual that can indicate exposure to a toxic substance:
"A biomarker is a molecular change in blood or some other tissue of a person
exposed to a toxic substance which can be used to qualitatively or quantitatively
evaluate the individual's exposure (biomarker of exposure) or the early pre-
symptomatic progression of the disease process (biomarker of effect).").
Marchant explains that there are several types of biomarkers and states that "the
most promising types of genetic biomarkers for the future, because of both their
potential sensitivity and specificity, are toxicogenomic changes consisting of
changes in gene expression, protein concentrations, or metabolite profiles."
Marchant, supra note 1, at 18.
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genetic makeup.' For example, about half of the Caucasian
population possesses a genetic variation associated with an
increased risk of bladder and lung cancer that could cause those
individuals to be more susceptible to toxic substances linked to
either bladder or lung cancer.'
These types of genetic data can be highly informative.
However, the interpretation of such genetic data varies based on a
combination of non-genetic factors, such as ethnicity and
geographic location; thus variations may have different impacts on
different populations.' Therefore, interpretation of genetic data is a
complex matter, which must take into account a combination of
factors and can have questionable predictive value.' Additionally,
jurors typically place high value on scientific evidence, especially
DNA evidence.'o Therefore, an unclear representation of genetic
data as conclusive could severely impact a jury's legal analysis and
decision in toxic tort litigation." As a result of the drastic potential
for impact on jury's analysis of causation, it is imperative that the
utmost precautions be taken when admitting genetic data in toxic
tort litigation. 2 Judges should be required to act as strict
gatekeepers of admissibility of genetic information and ensure that
juries are provided proper guidelines for the interpretation of such
data. "
The preliminary judicial assessment of genetic evidence in
toxic tort litigation should use a case-by-case analysis in which the
probative value of genetic information is to be weighed against its
6 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 7.
See Marchant, supra note 4, at 951 ("In approximately fifty percent of the
Caucasian population, a gene (GSTM1) coding for one in another set of
metabolic enzymes (the glutathione S-transferases) is completely deleted, which
is associated with an increased risk of bladder and lung cancer from exposure to
several toxic substances normally detoxified by the GSTMI enzyme.").
8 See id. at 953.
9 See id
a See Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science
Challenges For Trial Judges In Criminal Cases: Where The "Polybutadiene"
Meets The "Bitumen, " 18 WIDENER L.J. 309, 377-78 (2009).
" See id
12 See id at 378-81.
'3 See id
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potential harm to both the plaintiff and defendant, as well as its
potential to confuse the jury.14 The Supreme Court has established
extensive standards for admissibility of scientific evidence, which
are binding on federal judges only." Therefore, this article
strongly recommends that state courts adopt the standards set forth
by the Supreme Court and the applicable Federal Rules of
Evidence necessary to apply those standards. Finally, this article
proposes that formal guidelines be promulgated to outline in detail
the process by which judicial assessments of admissibility of
genetic data in toxic tort litigation should be made. The
promulgated guidelines should also clearly describe the
appropriate standards of admissibility to be applied and factors to
be considered. In order to prevent the premature admission of
genetic data in toxic tort litigation, when the interpretation of such
data may not be easily applied to the causation analysis, this article
proposes that judges follow a universal method for analysis of
genetic evidence in toxic tort litigation.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses current and
past uses of genetic data in the courtroom, and outlines the
potential uses and complications of applying genetic data to the
causation analysis in toxic tort litigation. Part III examines
potential hurdles in toxic tort litigation for the use of genetic data,
specifically the analysis of admissibility and potential privacy
concerns. Finally, Part IV proposes a universal method of judicial
analysis for admissibility determinations of genetic evidence in
toxic tort litigation, in addition to the promulgation of formal
guidelines for such admissibility determinations.
II. APPLICATION OF GENETIC TESTS IN ToxIC TORT
LITIGATION
Genetic testing data has become a common and useful form of
evidence admitted in courtrooms today. For example, there is
widespread use of DNA evidence and fingerprinting in criminal
courts to link a defendant to a crime scene.' 6 Genetic tests are also
14 See id. at 313
" See id.
16 See Shelton, supra note 10, at 310.
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frequently compelled in paternity litigation; for example, blood
tests are routinely required to determine the identity of the child's
father." In addition, courts have also relied on genetic evidence in
custody battles involving surrogate mothers." In Johnson v.
Calvert" the court relied on genetic evidence in determining
whether custody of an infant should be granted to the genetic
parents or the surrogate mother.2 0 In the examples discussed in
criminal, paternity, and custody litigation, the genetic data
involved has mostly revolved around genetic evidence establishing
identity rather than the genetic susceptibility and predisposition
data.2 ' Genetic susceptibility data, on the other hand, is much less
frequently admitted into evidence, even in the criminal context
where genetic evidence is heavily relied upon.22 While there have
been attempts to admit evidence of genetic predisposition data in
criminal trials, the majority of those attempts have proven
unsuccessful due to insufficient correlations between the genetic
'7 See People ex rel. Coleman v. Ely, 390 N.E.2d 140, 141 (111. App. Ct. 1979)
(compelling blood test to determine paternity, and holding that defendant could
be held in contempt for failure to comply); State v. Shaddinger, 702 So.2d. 965,
967 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997) (ordering paternity blood testing in accordance
with a state paternity statute); Lucas v. Becks, 52 Va. Cir. 338, 339 (2000)
(ordering blood test to establish that defendant was not the father of a child, as
the mother alleged).
8 Dorothy Nelkin, After Daubert: The Relevance and Reliability of Genetic
Information, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2120 (1994).
'9 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.1993).
20 Id. at 779-82 (ruling in favor of the genetic parents over surrogate mother).
21 See Nelkin, supra note 18.
22 See Diane Hoffmann & Karen Rothenberg, Judging Genes: Implications of
the Second Generation of Genetic Tests in the Courtroom, 66 MD. L. REV. 858,
870 (2007); Marchant, supra note 1, at 8-9 (explaining how genetic
susceptibility data can be utilized to demonstrate an individual's increased or
decreased susceptibility to a toxic substance based on their genetic profile:
"[t]he genes that code for enzymes involved in the metabolism of foreign
substances entering the boy, including pollutants and other toxic substances,
appear to be highly variable between individuals. Genetic variations
('polymorphisms') that affect susceptibility have been identified for most toxic
substances that have received significant regulatory scrutiny.").
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trait and the behavior in question.23 Genetic predisposition data
has, however, been successfully admitted and even compelled in
several civil cases.24
In medical malpractice cases, for example, genetic testing has
proven useful and has been compelled where the results could
show that the physician was not responsible for disabilities of a
newborn infant.25 In contrast, the admission of genetic
susceptibility and predisposition data as evidence has been limited
in the context of toxic tort litigation.26 Family history and expert
testimony, however, is often used in toxic tort litigation to establish
a genetic predisposition/susceptibility argument.27 For example, in
Wintz v. Northrop Corp., the court in a toxic tort case permitted the
use of expert testimony to establish that a child's injury was the
result of a genetic defect rather than the mother's exposure to
bromide during pregnancy. 28 Generally in tort cases, the defendant
takes the plaintiff as he finds him.29 The potential use of genetic
susceptibility/predisposition data, however, could allow defendants
in toxic tort cases to argue that due to the plaintiffs high
susceptibility or predisposition to a disease that there existed an
23 See Hoffman & Rothenberg, supra note 22, at 871-72 (discussing failed
attempts by defense attorneys to use an XYY chromosome defense arguments
based on a plaintiff s predisposition to violence).
24 See id. at 866-68 (stating that unlike genetic susceptibility data indicative of
an individual's increased or decreased susceptibility to a toxic substance, genetic
predisposition data could be argued by the defendant to be an alternative cause
"i.e., the plaintiff had a genetic predisposition to the disease at issue and likely
would have developed the disease independently of the exposure to the toxic
substance .... ).
25 See Harris v. Mercy Hosp., 596 N.E.2d 160, 163 (111. App. Ct. 1992);
Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 22, at 866.
26 Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 22, at 868.
27 Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 1997); Kaplowitz v.
Borden, Inc., 594 N.Y.S. 2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (allowing defendants to
compel genetic testing of a child to determine whether mother's in utero
exposure to spray paint caused child's illness).
28 Wintz, 110 F.3d at 510.
29 See Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W. 2d 537, 539 (1994) (describing the
"eggshell plaintiff' rule, which enables the tortfeasor defendant to be liable for
all damages even if the plaintiff had an existing condition that might have
exacerbated the injuries).
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alternate means of causation or a reason to limit damages, such as
in the Wintz case.30 Plaintiffs alternatively could use genetic data
to bolster their cases for causation by demonstrating definitive
proof of exposure as well as an increased likelihood of being
affected by exposure due to increased genetic susceptibility.'
Genetic susceptibility evidence can be utilized in a plaintiffs
causation argument by arguing that due to their genetic
susceptibility to the alleged toxic substance, their exposure to the
substance posed a heightened risk and thus was more likely to
cause their health affliction.3 2
A. Application of Genetic Testing Data to Causation
There are two main areas where genetic testing could provide
data potentially relevant to toxic tort litigation: (i) proof of
exposure to a toxic substance, and (ii) proof of "genetic
susceptibility of individual plaintiffs."" In the first area, genetic
data can be helpful in proving exposure to a particular toxic
substance through testing for genetic biomarkers.34 The second
area utilizes genetic susceptibility data to assist in establishing or
disproving specific causation." Genetic biomarkers represent
molecular changes that occur to cells after exposure to a toxic
substance, and indicate whether or not exposure to specific
substances has occurred.3 6 Some biomarkers indicate exposure to a
toxic substance generally; however, certain biomarkers can also
involve specific mutations in an individual's genes that can be used
30 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 8.
' See id.
32 See Steve C. Gold, The More We Know, The Less Intelligent We Are?-
How Genomic Information Should, And Should Not, Change Toxic Tort
Causation Doctrine, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 369, 407 (stating "[t]he plaintiffs
contend that some children are genetically susceptible to mercury poisoning and
cannot excrete or otherwise eliminate the mercury in the vaccine preservative"
(citing Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d. 574, 575 (E.D. Tex.
2005))).
3 Marchant, supra note 1, at 8.
34 Id. at 8.
3 Id.36 Id. at 19.
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to determine exactly which toxic substance caused the mutation."
Thus, this genetic data could be highly useful for both plaintiffs
and defendants in either proving or disproving exposure to the
toxic substance, thereby facilitating the causation analysis." While
biomarkers present a promising tool in toxic tort litigation, this
data would be used primarily to establish proof of exposure.39
Even with the assistance of biomarker data, questions remain as to
the quantity and effect of the exposure, as well as whether the
plaintiffs exposure to the toxic substance was the specific cause of
the plaintiffs illness.40 Similar exposure to a toxic substance can
occur in two different individuals and lead to the development of
disease in the first individual while having little to no negative
health impact on the second individual.4' The strongest
explanation for this difference resides in differing individual
susceptibility to disease, either due to increased susceptibility to
the particular toxic substance or a genetic predisposition to the
related disease.42 Throughout the human population, levels of
susceptibility vary as a result of individual "genetic variations,"
that are variations in the nucleotide sequence of genes.4 3 The
3 See Marchant, supra note 4, at 971-72; Ian C. Semeza & Lisa H. Weasel,
Molecular Epidemiology in Environmental Health: The Potential of Tumor
Suppressor Gene p53 as a Biomarker, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 155, 155-56
(1997); Steven J. Smith et al., Molecular Epidemiology of p53 Protein
Mutations in Workers Exposed to Vinyl Chloride, 147 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
302, 302-03 (1998).
38 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 20.
3 See id. at 18-20.
40 See id.
41 See Susan R. Poulter, Genetic Testing in Toxic Injury Litigation: The Path
to Scientific Certainty or BlindAlley?, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 211, 214 (2001).
42 See id. at 214-15.
43 See id. at 214 ("Genetic variation among individuals is characterized as
either a mutation, when less than 1% of the population carries a particular form
of the gene, or as a genetic polymorphism, when the less common form occurs
at greater than 1%."); Gold, supra note 32, at 384 (noting that a variation in a
single nucleotide base can cause disease or affect likelihood of disease
development: "A gene is a segment of DNA, found at a particular location
('locus') on a chromosome, which codes for a particular sequence of amino
acids as determined by the arrangement of the four nucleotide bases of which
DNA is made.").
[VOL. 13: 1
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likelihood that a genetic variation will actually result in a disease is
referred to as penetrance."
1. Genetic Data and the Plaintiff's Burden of Causation
Genetic data can be best used to bolster the plaintiffs case in a
toxic tort claim in two ways. First, the plaintiff can provide
genetic evidence, through the presence of biomarkers, of exposure
to the toxic substance in question. This evidence assists the
plaintiff in establishing the first aspect of causation which requires
actual exposure. However, the plaintiff must also prove specific
causation, thus demonstrating that the plaintiffs exposure to the
toxin at issue was more likely than not the cause of the plaintiffs
illness.4 5 In the case of many toxic substances, exposure increases
the risk of developing a particular illness, but not by the greater
than fifty percent standard typically required of the plaintiffs
burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence.46
Second, the use of genetic susceptibility evidence could be
used to support the plaintiffs causation analysis by ruling out other
potential causes.4 7 For example, plaintiffs could take a genetic test,
which shows they are not genetically predisposed to the disease at
issue, in order to strengthen their argument that it was the exposure
to the toxic substance that more likely than not doubled their risk
of developing the disease and caused their illness.48 The use of
genetic susceptibility data has been successfully used to strengthen
a plaintiffs causation analysis in toxic tort claims through expert
genetic testimony to dispute genetic predisposition and point to
increased causation as a result of exposure.49 An example of such
44 See Poulter, supra note 41, at 214.
45 See id. at 217 (stating that the plaintiff must prove causation by a
preponderance of evidence, thus proving that the exposure to the toxic substance
must have at least doubled the plaintiffs risk of developing the illness at issue
with an increased likelihood of greater than 50% resulting from exposure).
46 See Marchant, supra note 4, at 954; Frederica P. Perera, Environment and
Cancer Who Are Susceptible?, 278 SCIENCE 1068, 1072 (1997) ("In
epidemiology, it has been difficult to detect relative risks of 1.5 or even 2.0.").
47 See Poulter, supra note 41, at 218.
48 See id.
49 See Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1082 (N.J. Supp. Ct.
1992).
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a use can be seen in Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.,o where the judge
permitted a plaintiffs expert testimony regarding the absence of
colon cancer in the plaintiffs family history in order to strengthen
the plaintiffs causation analysis." Additionally, plaintiffs could
utilize genetic tests which could indicate a possible increased
likelihood of being effected by a toxin due to their increased
susceptibility to said toxin.52
While genetic susceptibility evidence has been admitted to
assist in plaintiffs' causation analysis, this approach has thus far
mostly failed." The genetic susceptibility argument in support of
causation has not failed on its merits, but rather it has failed due to
a lack of properly developed legal arguments.5 4 For example, in
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.," the court rejected expert
testimony of genetic susceptibility to silicone (from silicone breast
implants).5 6 In Hall, the plaintiffs susceptibility argument was
poorly developed because the research presented to the court was
not peer reviewed and the plaintiffs offered no evidence that
plaintiffs carried any such gene conferring an increased genetic
susceptibility to silicone." Despite the lack of success that
plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation have had in using genetic
susceptibility to support causation, it still remains clear that there is
a strong potential for this strategy to be a useful tool for plaintiffs."
Another case that illustrates the potential benefits to plaintiffs
of genetic susceptibility data is Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc.59
Although the court in Easter refused to admit testimony that some
children have genetic susceptibility to the preservative in the
defendant's vaccine, the expert testimony was excluded on the
basis that the genetic data proved that the plaintiff did not have a
5 Id.
s Id.
52 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 8.
53 See id at 11.
54 See id
5 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
5 1Id. at 1456.
5 See id
58 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 12.
5 358 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
[VOL. 13: 110
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genetic susceptibility to the preservative.60 Thus, the Easter
decision suggests that the genetic susceptibility evidence may have
been admitted to support causation had the plaintiff been able to
show not only that susceptibility to the toxic substance was a
possibility, but also that the plaintiff had a genetic variation that
conferred such susceptibility.6'
Thus, the application of genetic data in toxic tort litigation
holds substantial potential to offer additional evidence supporting
plaintiff's burden of proof of causation by establishing exposure or
increased susceptibility to the toxic substance at issue, or both.62
Whether genetic data is admitted to bolster the plaintiffs causation
argument or to support the defendant's argument against causation,
caution must be used in determining such admissibility.63 For
example, while the presence of a biomarker can indicate proof of
exposure, Steve Gold contends "to require its presence to support a
causation inference is to assume that the absence of the biomarker
precludes causation."64 Gold further explains the dangers of
requiring the presence of a biomarker and highlights two main
issues." First, such a requirement is only effective if "no causal
pathway exists between a chemical and a disease other than the
pathway that produces the biomarker."6 6  Second, if no other
pathway exists, "the science seems to be pointing at a world of
numerous risk factors, some genetic and some environmental;"
6old. at 575 ("The plaintiffs have conceded that they cannot prove, in Jordan's
case, that his autism was caused by thimerosal. This is because Jordan does not
meet the genetic profile for children who, according to the plaintiffs, are at an
increased risk for developing autism caused by thimerosal in pediatric vaccines.
Because the plaintiffs have conceded they cannot prove that Jordan's autism was
caused by thimerosal, they seek to recover on a claim that several co-morbid
conditions suffered by Jordan were instead caused by, or contributed to by,
Jordan's exposure to the thimerosal contained in the pediatric vaccines.").
6" See id.
62 See id.; see Marchant, supra note 1, at 7.
63 See Gold, supra note 32, at 403-05.
64 Id. at 405.
65 See id
66 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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thus such evidence as biomarker and genetic susceptibility should
not be the sole factors to be considered in causation analysis."
2. Genetic Data and the Defendant's Argument Against
Causation
As discussed above, there are significant potential benefits of
genetic data to the plaintiffs case for causation. However, genetic
data could also be employed to support the defendant's argument
against causation. Defendants may choose to use genetic
susceptibility data to argue an alternative causation other than
exposure to the toxic substance.68 In fact, defendants have already
been successful in requesting genetic information for the purpose
of arguing alternative causation.69 For example, it is common for
defendants to seek information regarding a plaintiffs medical
history and family history of disease to argue that genetic
susceptibility was the cause of plaintiffs illness rather than
exposure to a toxic substance.70  In addition to expert
testimony regarding family history, the influence of environmental
factors, and other potential alternative causes, defendants have also
used defenses based on alternative causation using genetic test
results for susceptibility." However, thus far the defense of
alternative causation due to susceptibility has been mostly
unsuccessful due to a lack of credible testimony, a lack of proof
that the plaintiff is affected by the particular variation conferring
susceptibility or both.72 Some courts, on the other hand, have
shown a willingness to go as far as to heavily rely on genetic
evidence or lack thereof, with regards to proof of causation." For
67 Id. at 421.
68 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 12.
69 Poulter, supra note 41, at 218.
70 Id.
71 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 12-13.
72 See, e.g., Willey v. Ketterer, 869 F.2d 648 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding a lack of
evidence of genetic predisposition to cerebral palsy); Dombrowski v. Gould
Elecs., 85 F. Supp. 2d 456, 477 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (finding a lack of valid
testimony showing alternative causation due to family history or environmental
factors).
7 Harris v. Mercy Hosp., 596 N.E.2d 160, 161 (111. App. Ct. 1992); see also
Cord v. City of Los Angeles, No. B167756, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 8967, at *2
(Cal App. 2d Dist. Sept. 30, 2004) (excluding plaintiffs' medical expert's
[VOL. 13: 112
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example, in Cord v. City of Los Angeles", the defendant argued
that where the plaintiff alleged exposure to benzene and other
chemicals caused her lymphoma, the plaintiff failed to test for
biomarkers and argued that biomarkers are "necessary to prove
exposure, absorption and toxicity . . . ."" The defense expert in
Cord further argued that the "absence of biomarkers makes it
impossible to establish causation" and the court thereafter found
that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to establish
causation."6
While defendants may argue, as did the defendants in Cord,
that the absence of biomarker evidence precludes plaintiffs from
establishing causation, the District Court of New Jersey in Quickel
v. Lorillard, Inc.," held to the contrary." In Quickel, the plaintiffs
argued that exposure to asbestos from the defendants' cigarette
filters caused the mesothelioma suffered by the plaintiff.79
However, the defendants in Quickel argued that the absence of an
autopsy obtaining biomarkers of asbestos related exposure from
the plaintiffs lung tissue demonstrated a lack of proof of
causation.o Contrary to the holding in Cord, the court in Quickel
held that "the fact that no study was done at autopsy also does not
lead to the conclusion that such fibers were absent.""' The Quickel
court reasoned that "plaintiffs need not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that particles of asbestos were ingested from defendants'
cigarettes and lodged in Mr. Quickel's lungs causing his
mesothelioma; they must prove causation to a jury by
preponderance of the evidence." Thus, the court in Quickel did not
consider the lack of biomarker evidence as dispositive, rather the
court stated that "the plaintiff does not have the burden, through
expert testimony, to rule out all other possible causes of Mr.
testimony because there was no statistically significant link between exposure to
the toxin and developing lymphoma).
74 See Cord, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 8967, at *2.
7 See id. at *5.
76 Id. at *6.
n No. CIV.A.95-5255, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23453 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 1999).
78 See id. at *19; Cord, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 8967, at *2.
7 Quickel at * 1.
-Id. at *18-19.
8' Id. at *21.
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Quickel's mesothelioma. Indeed, mesothelioma is a rare disease,
and its diagnosis (which is undisputed in this case) is associated
with an overwhelming 80% of all such events with exposure to
crocidolite asbestos beyond background levels."82
While the admission of genetic susceptibility data as part of the
defendant's case has been implemented in toxic tort litigation, it is
not commonplace." However, such evidence has been
successfully utilized in medical malpractice cases, especially those
involving pregnancy and newborns.84 For example, in Harris v.
Mercy Hospital," the court allowed the defendants to compel the
plaintiff to submit to a blood test in order to determine whether a
genetic anomaly was responsible for the plaintiffs condition as an
alternative defense to a medical malpractice claim.86 The court in
Harris reasoned that the probative value of the evidence
outweighed the potential risk to the plaintiff, focusing on the
minimal intrusiveness and the routine nature of the actual blood
test compelled."
In cases such as Harris, genetic susceptibility data has the
ability to quantitatively demonstrate alternative causation by
showing a genetic variation that is accepted by the scientific
community to be practically synonymous with the afflicted
disease." Genetic variations shown to be highly penetrant (such as
the variation in Harris) confer a significantly increased
susceptibility to the disease associated with that particular
variation, whereas less penetrant variations may have little to no
82 id
83 See, e.g., Marchant, supra note 1.
84 See Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 22, at 866.
85 596 N.E.2d 160 (1Il. App. 1st Dist. 1992).
8 6 Id. at 162.
87 Id. at 163 (reasoning that where the plaintiff puts his physical condition at
issue, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215, the Court has discretion to
order plaintiff to submit to a blood test). The court further held that "[b]lood
tests are routine procedures in our everyday life" and that the plaintiff presented
"no competent evidence that the drawing of blood presents an unreasonable risk
to Jennifer [plaintiff]" Id. (citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436
(1957)).
88 See Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 22, at 896-97.
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impact on one's health.89 In the case of highly penetrant variations,
such as Huntington's disease, the variation has been shown to
correlate almost one hundred percent with development of the
disease, which makes the possibility of causation resulting from
exposure highly unlikely." Therefore, in cases involving highly
penetrant susceptibility genes, admission of such data will be
extremely probative in a defense of alternative causation by the
defendant and there is a very strong argument for their admission."
Defendants could alternatively employ genetic data to attempt
to disprove plaintiffs exposure to the toxic substance at issue
through the absence of a biomarker or signature mutation
scientifically linked to such exposure.92 For example, in Tompkin
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,9 the defendant argued alterative
causation where the plaintiff alleged lung cancer resulting from
cigarette smoking and also worked with asbestos.94 An expert for
the defense in Tompkin testified that the plaintiff decedent's lung
tissue lacked mutations in the P53 and K-Ras genes known to be
caused by smoking and further testified that the plaintiffs lung
cancer "most likely resulted from his occupational exposure to
silicates and asbestos . . . . In Tompkin, an expert witness for the
plaintiff testified that Tompkin's "cancer was due to the combined
effect of his cigarette smoking and his exposure to asbestos."96
The expert's assertion was based on the reasoning that "asbestos
interacts with cigarette smoking by a process we call synergy
whereby they have an affect which is beyond an additive effect of
each of their potencies."" Even in light of these highly conflicting
expert testimonies, the jury in Tompkin found that the plaintiffs
89 Poulter, supra note 41, at 214 ("One type [of genetic variation] involves
anomalies in a single gene that are highly likely, sometimes virtually certain, to
result in disease or abnormality."). For example, "mutations in [the] BRCA1
and BRCA2 . .. confer[s] a more than 50% lifetime risk of some cancers." Id
90
,1d. at 214.
9' See id. at 231.
92 See Gold, supra note 32, at 402-05.
93 362 F. 3d 882 (2004).
94 See id. at 890.
95 Id
96Idat88
97id
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cancer was caused by his asbestos exposure, clearly giving extreme
deference to the absence of biomarkers."
B. Problems with Genetic Data and Causation
The application of genetic data to the causation analysis is
complicated in several respects. First, the presence or absence of
biomarkers must not be viewed as determinative, as Gold explains
biomarkers "could of course be relevant to an alleged causal
relationship. Relatively rarely, however, is it likely to be
absolutely conclusive"." Second, the interpretation of genetic data
can become blurred by cultural assumptions and varying biological
arguments such as biological determinism (or genetic
determinism).ioo
An additional complicating factor is that the nature of genetic
susceptibility data is highly complex, which leads to difficulties in
interpreting and explaining the implications of such data.'o For
example, in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Product Group, Inc.,102 the
U.S. Court of Appeals reversed a district court ruling precluding
plaintiffs expert testimony, holding that the expert's testimony
"may give rise to a plausible hypothesis, but not a reliable
inference" based on the reasoning that exposure to benzene had not
been scientifically linked to the specific disease suffered by the
plaintiff." The First Circuit in Milward held that the district court
exceeded the scope of its discretion and "misunderstood" the
expert testimony regarding weighing the factors which he
98 See id. at 886.
99 See Gold, supra note 32, at 406.
100 Nelkin, supra note 18, at 2125 (explaining the concept of biological
determinism in society, stating that "[als research extends our understanding of
the human genome, the media increasingly convey the idea that personhood,
behavior, and human destiny can be defined in terms of DNA"). Appropriating
genetic concepts, the media use the gene to explain individual differences ("the
genes of genius"), race and gender stereotypes ("differences lie in the genes"),
family relationships ("the importance of blood ties"), and behavioral problems
("good and bad genes"). Id.
101 See Tompkin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 362 F. 3d 882, 886 (6th Cir.
2004).
102 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011).
103 See id. at 25.
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concluded "supported the inference that the association between
benzene exposure and APL is genuine and causal."" The Milward
case highlights the difficulty of interpreting genetic data and its
application and admissibility as evidence with regards to
establishing causation."o
1. The Complex Nature of Genetic Susceptibility Data
The admissibility and function of genetic susceptibility data
become increasingly questionable when the genes involved are less
penetrant or have completely unknown penetrance.o6 When the
genetic variation at issue involves less penetrant disease
susceptibility genes, the evidentiary relationship between the
susceptibility and the exposure becomes more difficult to
interpret."' In this case the genetic susceptibility may be identified
as one factor affecting the plaintiffs likelihood of acquiring the
disease."o There may be many additional factors, however, which
could have an equal or greater impact on the plaintiffs likelihood
of acquiring the disease, such as the exposure to a toxic
substance.o' As a result, when dealing with less penetrant genes,
identifying a quantifiable value to place on each factor affecting
risk becomes highly complex.
In addition to determining the individual impact of each factor,
the scenario becomes increasingly complex as the interactions
between multiple factors are taken into account. For example, two
factors may combine to react "additively, synergistically, or
antagonistically.""' In other words, when multiple factors are
104 See id. at 26.
1os See generally id.
106 See Poulter, supra note 41, at 232-33.
107 Id.
108 See id. (noting that in addition to genetic susceptibility and exposure to the
toxic substance at issue, additional factors can affect plaintiffs likelihood of
acquiring the disease, including environmental factors such as nutrition and
lifestyle).
'
0 See id. at 224.
0 Id. at 227-28. An example of a synergistic effect of factors would be
smoking cigarettes and exposure to asbestos, which together have a
multiplicative effect on risk of lung cancer:
Roughly speaking, significant occupational exposure to asbestos
increases the rate of lung cancer by a factor of 5, while a significant
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present, such as a genetic predisposition and exposure to a toxic
substance, those factors may relate to each other in several
different ways yielding several different cumulative effects."'
Depending on whether the factors interact in an additive or
synergistic manner, and depending on how great the synergistic
effect is, the analysis of an alternative causation argument can
change drastically."2 It is generally thought that genetic variations
acting to predispose individuals to a disease act in combination
with exposure to a substance."' However, in order to fully
understand the impact of each factor there must be clear evidence
as to how the factors interact.l' This is yet another complication in
assigning a specific predictive weight to a genetic variant that is
not highly penetrant. Currently, available genetic tests are
capable of determining increased susceptibility to a number of
diseases, including breast cancer and Huntington's disease."' The
interpretation of genetic tests for disease susceptibility, however, is
not simple and leaves much room for debate as to what value a
jury should assign to the predictability of their results."' In
addition to determining how individual factors interact, other
separate factors may also complicate the analysis of genetic
smoking history increases the rate of lung cancer by a factor of at least
10. Thus, for a nonsmoking asbestos worker with lung cancer, the
likelihood of causation by asbestos exposure is 80% (4/5), and for the
smoker, the likelihood that smoking caused the lung cancer is 90%
(9/10)." Among smoking asbestos workers, however, the rate of lung
cancer is increased by a factor of 50 over background ... rather than
the factor of 14 expected by adding the separate effects of asbestos
exposure and smoking.
Id.
" See id. at 224-28. The combined effect of multiple factors could be
additive, in that if both factors have an individual 10 percent increased risk, they
will combine additively to have a total increased risk of 20 percent (10+10). Id.
Alternatively, the same factors could interact synergistically, combining in a
multiplicative nature to result in a total risk of 100 percent (10x10), or
antagonistically resulting in a lesser-combined effect than either additive or
synergistic interactions). Id.
112 See Poulter, supra note 41, at 229.
" See id. at 229-30.
114 See id.
"s Id. at 216.
116 See id.
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variations."' For example, the same genetic variation can have a
different impact on susceptibility within different populations and
ethnic groups."' Such additional variables make any interpretation
more difficult and any conclusion more tenuous.
In addition to the differing impact of genetic variations among
different populations or individuals, interactions between genetic
variations and toxic substances as well as the additional component
of environmental factors combine for a very complex scientific and
legal analysis." 9 As a result, the ability of genetic susceptibility
data to have predictive value with many less penetrant genes is
questionable, which therefore leads to questions of accuracy,
admissibility, and interpretation in the courtroom. 20 This article
will further explore what effects the accuracy of genetic data
combined with the ease of interpretation by the jury have on
admissibility.
2. Impact of Cultural Assumptions and Biological Arguments
In assessing the implications of new scientific research, such as
genetic susceptibility testing, it is important to remember that even
scientific developments are the result of human activity and remain
"subject to people's assumptions, preconceptions, and biases."l21
For example, the way scientific research is structured and analyzed
can be influenced by an individual's race or gender stereotypes.12
Additionally, the press plays a role in the way the public perceives
and interprets scientific research and can affect the way genetic
data will be understood by judges and jurors in the courtroom.123
The concept of biological or genetic determinism, for example, is a
popular genetic concept conveyed to the public.124  Biological
determinism suggests that a person's characteristics are predictable
and genetic traits are "hard-wired" into the "human constitution"
"17 id.
"1 See Poulter, supra note 41, at 216.
"
9 See id. at 216-18.
12 0 See id.
121 Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinisms, and Torts: The Example
ofDiscovery in Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U.L. REV. 1025, 1068 (1997).
122 See Nelkin, supra note 18, at 2125.
123 See id.
124 id.
FALL 2011] 19
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
and are therefore predetermined.125 Alternatively, the concept of
maternal determinism suggests that a person's characteristics are
determined as a result of the mothering they receive.126
Applying concepts such as biological and maternal
determinism in the courtroom could lead to further complications
and bias in understanding the application of genetic data to the
causation analysis.127 For example, in Andon v. 302-304 Mott St.
Assocs.,128 the defendants in a lead exposure case argued that the
infant plaintiffs mental deficit was not the result of exposure to
lead, but rather was genetically inherited from the infant's
mother.'29 In Andon, the court reversed an order compelling the
plaintiffs mother to submit to an IQ test in support of the
defendant's alternative causation argument, holding that such an
inquiry would only raise more questions and not assist in the
determination of causation.'o In toxic tort cases, such as Andon, it
is crucial that requests for genetic testing, such as the IQ test at
issue in Andon, be limited in order to assure that only evidence that
will not further complicate the causation analysis is admitted.'3 '
The type and quality of mothering an individual receives, the genes
an individual possesses, and the environment in which an
individual is raised are all factors affecting the characteristics of
that individual.'32 However, no one factor alone is typically
deterministic.'3 3 The consideration of these genetic concepts
further adds to the complexity of the interpretation of genetic data
in the causation analysis and must be carefully censored in order to
125 Id. ("The assumption pervading popular culture is that genetic traits are
hard-wired and immutable, a powerful force in shaping social behavior, and a
predictable part of the human constitution.").
126 Wriggins, supra note 121, at 1042.
127 See id.
128 257 A.D.2d 37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1999).
29 Id. at 41.
130 Id. (stating that the admission of so such maternal IQ data would result in
"turning the fact-finding process into a series of mini-trials regarding, at a
minimum, the factors contributing to the mother's IQ, and possibly, that of other
family members").
131 See id.
132 See Wriggins, supra note 121, at 1042-44.
133 See id.
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prevent the admission of evidence that will further confuse a
jury.134
III. POTENTIAL HURDLES TO USE IN THE COURTROOM
This section will discuss two primary hurdles to the acceptance
of the use of genetic susceptibility data in the courtroom,
admissibility and privacy. The analysis of genetic predisposition
data can become extremely complex, especially when less
penetrant genes are at issue."' The complex nature of this analysis
results in decreased accuracy of predictive value as well as
possible confusion of jurors.136 In addition, the very essence of the
genetic data at issue in many toxic tort claims is of a highly
personal nature and raises several privacy concerns."
A. Admissibility Standards for Genetic Data
The current standard applicable to the admissibility of genetic
testing data has been recently detailed by the United States
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,'" and expanded upon by the Supreme Court in General
Electric v. Joiner"' and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.4 The
Supreme Court in Daubert explicitly rejected the previous test for
admissibility of genetic data, known as the Frye Test."' Under the
Frye Test, judges were generally deferential to scientific experts,
and scientific evidence was generally admissible if it had acquired
"general acceptance" in the scientific community.'4 2 The standard
declared in Daubert requires federal judges to make a preliminary
assessment of scientific testimony by assessing the validity of the
134 See generally Nelkin, supra note 18, at 2125 ("The presence of a biological
condition should not be confused with a specific behavioral trait or even a
disease. The gene is not a completely deterministic force, independent of
history or environment.").
135 See Poulter, supra note 41, at 214.
13 6 See id.
137 Marchant, supra note 1, at 35.
13' 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
" 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
140 526 U.S. 137 (1998).
141 Ioffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 22, at 895.
142 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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underlying reasoning and methodology and determining whether
the scientific knowledge can be properly applied to the facts at
issue in order to assist the trier of fact's determination.143
The Daubert Court placed significant emphasis on the standard
of admissibility established by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.'" According to Rule 403, "evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." 45 The majority of
respectable, emerging genetic research and tests will likely pass the
"scientific acceptance" prong of Daubert provided they use the
correct scientific method and are published in a peer-reviewed
journal.146 While courts have not been most concerned with the
second prong of Daubert (relevant to the facts at issue), it seems
highly plausible that the complicated analysis of multiple-factor
genetic susceptibility data may further confuse jurors rather than
assist in their understanding of the causation analysis.'47
The Supreme Court in Joiner interpreted Daubert and dealt
with the question of whether the evidence presented is too far
removed or speculative to determine whether exposure was indeed
the specific cause of the plaintiffs disease.'48 The Supreme Court
held that "a court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered."' 49 The
reasoning of Joiner seems to be aimed directly towards the
potentially complex situation discussed previously, dealing with
less penetrant disease susceptibility genes.' Finally, in Kumho,
the Supreme Court upheld and expanded upon Daubert by holding
that the Daubert standard applies to all experts, not merely
143 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
144 See id.
145 FED. R. EVID. 403.
146 G. Mark Whitehead, The Use and Abuse of Genetic Testing:
Toxicogenomics in the Courtroom, 17 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 963 (2002).
147 See id.; Poulter, supra note 41, at 220.
148 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 140 (1997).
149 Id. at 146.
"s See id.; Whitehead, supra note 146, at 963.
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scientific experts."' Furthermore, the Supreme Court's holding in
Kumho upheld and strengthened Joiner.5 2 The Court in Kumho
held that the evidence at issue was too unreliable to present to a
jury and, therefore, inadmissible despite being based on accepted
methodology, thus reiterating the analytical gap aspect of Joiner.'
The combined effect of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho is to
encourage both plaintiffs and defendants to bring forth genetic data
evidence which appears to be reliable and not too attenuated from
causation."' Thus, the most likely result in future toxic tort cases
involving genetic susceptibility data is that the more penetrant a
gene is and the fewer additional factors which need to come into
play, the more likely the evidence will be ruled admissible."'
Conversely, less penetrant disease-causing genetic data will be less
likely to be admissible as too many factors will need to be taken
into consideration, thereby increasing the speculative nature of the
evidence and decreasing its reliability.'56
B. Privacy Concerns Regarding Genetic Data
Genetic information is of a most personal nature and, as a
result, is highly sensitive.'5 ' DNA and genomic data, unlike a
fingerprint, yield much more intimate information about a person
than just an identity to match to a name.'5 ' A person's genetic
profile details who they are, what they inherited from past
generations, and provides insight into what future illnesses may
afflict a person.'59 A person's genetic profile may be even too
personal and revealing for that individual to handle and, thus, the
plaintiff themself may prefer not to know the results. 60 For
example, certain genetic predispositions, such as the predisposition
for Huntington's disease, are so strong as to virtually guarantee
'' Kunho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1998).
152 Shelton, supra note 10, at 316-17.
1 See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148; Shelton, supra note 10, at 316-17.
154 See Shelton, supra note 10, at 316-18.
1 See id.; Poulter, supra note 41, 214-15.
156 See Shelton, supra note 10, at 316-18; see Poulter, supra note 41, 214-15.
'5 Marchant, supra note 1, at 35.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id.
FALL 2011] 23
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
later onset of a disease.'6 ' For some people, as the American
proverb suggests, "ignorance is bliss."l 62
In the case of genetic information, especially information with
a negative implication, some individuals may prefer not to know if
they are afflicted, or are likely to be afflicted by a devastating
illness.'63 In addition to an individual's desire not to choose to
explore their own genetic profile, many individuals do not want
other people, such as family members and employers, let alone
strangers, to gain access to such highly personal information."
Despite the prevalent privacy concerns, the toxic tort plaintiff has
placed their health at issue, and thus it seems reasonable for courts
to request relevant and probative genetic data.' 5 Provided that
proper safeguards are in place to protect unnecessary access to
genetic information, it is permissible for courts to use, and even
compel, genetic information.'66 Every individual has an interest in
his or her privacy. Yet when a plaintiff places his or her health at
issue and the probative value of genetic information outweighs the
harm and does not pose an unreasonable risk to the plaintiff, courts
have reasonable discretion to compel submission to relevant and
minimally invasive genetic testing.' 67  Therefore, privacy issues
exist when defendants seek to admit evidence, especially evidence
that is irrelevant or substantially harmful to plaintiffs, rather than
when plaintiffs seek to admit genetic evidence.168
Given the highly personal and sensitive nature of genetic data,
there is a strong need to take precautions to prevent others from
gaining access to such information.169  However, genetic
161 Poulter, supra note 41, at 214.
162 Thomas Gray, An Ode on a Distant Prospect ofEton College, UNIVERSITY
OF OXFORD http://www.thomasgray.org/cgi-bin/display.cgi?text=odec (last
visited Dec. 16, 2011).
163 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 35.
'64 See id
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id.; Harris v. Mercy Hosp., 596 N.E.2d 160, 161 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
168 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 35.
169 Ronald M. Green & A. Mathew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing
Features for Policy Analysis, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 571, 572-74 (1998)
(discussing "informational risks" of genetic information).
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information has the potential to be extremely probative to both
plaintiffs and defendants."' As a result, questions arise as to
whether or not judges should be permitted to compel genetic
testing of plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation. The answer is two-fold.
First, courts have permitted compulsion of genetic tests where the
potential probative value outweighs the risk of harm to the
plaintiff."' The reasoning here is that in toxic tort litigation, the
plaintiff places their health at issue and if a court is to allow
plaintiffs to admit genetic evidence in support of causation, then it
would only be fair to allow defendants to use genetic information
to argue modes of alternative causation." 2 Second, judges should
consider the reasonableness of the request, such as routine and
minimally invasive blood samples, which courts typically allow."'
IV. POLICY PROPOSALS
This article proposes a method of judicial analysis for
admissibility determinations of genetic evidence in toxic tort
litigation allowing broad discretion to judges, in addition to the
promulgation for formal guidelines for such admissibility
determinations. Genetic data has already been utilized in toxic tort
litigation and possesses significant potential for future use in this
field.1' Emerging genetic technology may be able to support both
the plaintiffs ability to prove causation and the defendant's ability
to disprove causation."' However the complex nature of genetic
data as highlighted herein suggests the importance of clear
guidelines for judges faced with admissibility determinations of
genetic evidence in toxic tort litigation."'
A. Method ofJudicial Analysis of Genetic Data
The foremost consideration of judges confronted with
admissibility questions regarding genetic data is to analyze the
170 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 10-14.
'7' Kaplowitz v. Borden, Inc., 594 N.Y.S.2d 744, 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
172 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 35-36.
173 See supra p. 5 and note 17.
174 Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 22, at 868.
"1 See id at 867-68; see also Poulter, supra note 41, at 214.
176 See Shelton, supra note 10, at 310.
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information in their "gatekeeper" role under the framework
established by the Supreme Court in Daubert, Joiner, and
Kumho."' While Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho apply to federal
courts, this article proposes that state court judges should follow
this federal standard in order to ensure universal application of
genetic data in toxic tort litigation. Thus, judges should consider
the following: (i) whether the data is scientifically valid and
generally accepted in the scientific community; (ii) whether the
data will assist the trier of fact in their determination of causation;
and (iii) whether the gap between the data proffered and the
conclusion offered is too attenuated or speculative."
The judge's inquiries, however, should not cease after the
Daubert/Joiner/Kumho analysis. In their determinations, judges
should further consult recent and relevant guidelines and
regulatory statements of prominent agencies, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug
Administration.179 Additionally, if there is a relevant state statute
regarding the admissibility of genetic evidence, then the judge
should consult this statute and consider any further limitations set
forth by the state legislature.'" An exemplary model of this type of
preliminary analysis of genetic evidence by a state court can be
seen in Taylor v. State."' In Taylor, an Oklahoma state court
adopted and effectively applied the Daubert standard of analysis,
while focusing on the relevance and probative value of the genetic
evidence and outlining a detailed framework of analysis.'82 The
Taylor court completed an exemplary in-depth study of the
scientific background regarding the admissibility determination of
the DNA profiling evidence at issue and further noted the
"' See id. at 313-16.
178 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589-94 (1993); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S.137, 148-49 (1998).
179 See Brian Huseman, Taylor v. State, Rule 706 and the DNA Database:
Future Directions in DNA Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 397, 442 (1997);
Marchant, supra note 1, at 33.
80 See Huseman, supra note 179, at 442.
"' 889 P.2d 319, 328-32 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
182 See id.
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following with respect to the reliability determination of scientific
or technical evidence:
[flour factors, neither exclusive nor necessarily dispositive, may aid the
reliability determination: first, whether the scientific method at issue
has been or can be tested; second, whether the theory has been
subjected to peer review; third, whether the scientific procedure has
known or potential rate of error; and fourth, whether the scientific
evidence at issue has gained acceptance in the relevant scientific
community.'83
Furthermore, judges should consider the totality of
circumstances, including the following additional factors, with no
one factor being determinative: (i) the relevance of the genetic data
to the issue of causation; (ii) the balance of the potential probative
value of the data weighted against the potential hann to the
plaintiff and the plaintiff's interest in genetic privacy; (iii) the
reasonableness of the intrusion posed by any compelled tests; (iv)
the penetrance level of the gene(s); (v) the complexity of the
application to the causation analysis and the capability of a
reasonable juror to clearly understand the implications of the data;
(vi) the quantity and quality of additional factors which may also
affect the causation analysis; (vii) the length of time since the
technology has emerged and became accepted in the scientific
community; and (viii) the origin of the technology (i.e., publically
versus privately funded, and whether either party has a stake in or
financial interest in the research, or has substantially funded the
research primarily or through subsidiaries).184
B. Promulgation of Universal Guidelines
While there is Supreme Court case law regarding the
application of genetic susceptibility data in toxic tort litigation,
additional resources would be a significant asset to judges acting as
the gatekeepers in these cases.'" This article proposes the
promulgation of official guidelines by a resource commonly used
" Id. at 339 n.88.
184 See FED. R. EvID. 706; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589
(1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S.137, 148 (1998); Huseman, supra note 179, at 442.
185 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136; Kumho, 526 U.S. at
148.
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by judges, such as the American Law Report, the Bureau of
National Affairs, the Food and Drug Administration, or the
Environmental Protection Agency, to assist judges with these
complex determinations. Such guidelines would help ensure
consistency throughout the judicial system in the application of
genetic susceptibility data in toxic tort litigation, as well as help
prevent premature admission of unreliable genetic data.'
The suggested guidelines should detail the judge's role as
gatekeeper and the analytical framework of the Daubert, Joiner,
and Kumho case-by-case analysis."' In addition, the guidelines
should detail the factors listed above to be considered when
determining the admissibility of genetic data in toxic tort causation
analysis. Example scenarios detailing and explaining the different
types of genetic variations and the possible interactions between
multiple factors should also be provided within the official
guidelines. Similar but more general guidelines for courts have
already been promulgated by the National Academy of Sciences
regarding the general use of DNA in courts, and provide an
excellent resource for judges.'" Additionally, the proposed
guidelines should provide sample jury instructions regarding
genetic susceptibility data.'89 Furthermore, this article suggests
that the implication of the genetic data and its application and
scientific significance should be briefly explained to the judge and
jury by an expert in the field who was chosen by the court rather
than an expert witness for either party.'" The Federal Rules of
Evidence Rule 706 permits such appointments of expert witnesses
by the court; however, this article proposes that it is imperative for
all states adopt an equivalent to Rule 706 in order to permit state
court judges to appoint expert witnesses."'
186 See Huseman, supra note 179, at 442; Poulter, supra note 41, at 224.
187 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136; Kumho, 526 U.S. at
148; Huseman, supra note 179, at 442.
188 See Huseman, supra note 179, at 447; Glennda Chui, Proposal Aims to
Legitimize Use ofDNA Evidence in Court, SEATTLE TIMES, May 4, 1996, at A3.
189 See Shelton, supra note 10, at 376-78.
190 See Huseman, supra note 179, at 441-42.
1' See FED. R. EvID. 706; Huseman, supra note 179, at 442.
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Finally, this article proposes that proportional recovery should
be considered in toxic tort litigation. By allowing proportional
recovery, plaintiffs would not have the burden of proving causation
attributable to exposure to the toxic substance is greater than fifty
percent likelihood.9 2 In addition, this type of recovery would also
reduce the overcompensation problem which results from forcing
defendants to compensate a plaintiff for the entirety of the loss
when the defendant was only fifty-one percent responsible.'9 3
Allowing proportional recovery would reduce the need for all or
nothing causation and allow for a more reasonable burden on the
defendants.'9 4 In addition, this type of recovery system could
alleviate the necessity for plaintiffs to rule out any genetic
susceptibility and prevent defendants from over exploiting the
effects of genetic variations in order to escape liability.' For
example, if fifty percent of the Caucasian population has a genetic
variation predisposing them to lung cancer, should that be
considered a rare genetic mutation when so many individuals are
affected?"' In such instances, rather than allowing defendants to
escape liability altogether, proportional liability would eliminate
the need for all or nothing compensation and allow just
compensation of plaintiffs, which jurors are much more likely to
accept compared to overcompensation.'9 7
V. CONCLUSION
The field of genetic susceptibility is an emerging field which
holds the potential to revolutionize the way toxic tort cases are
analyzed.' As with any emerging area of science, however, great
caution is required to ensure that technology in this field is not
prematurely applied to litigation before an accurate significance of
the technology has been established. As Professor Gold
insightfully noted, "[a]though there is such a thing as 'bad
192 See Poulter, supra note 41, at 224.
193 See id.
194 See id.
'9' See id.
196 See Marchant, supra note 4, at 951.
'97 See Poulter, supra note 41, at 224.
198 See Marchant, supra note 1, at 9-14.
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science,' or more properly, 'non-science,' even among scientists
'good science is not some unanimously-endorsed Platonic ideal at
any given time.' "' Consequently, this area of science and
technology presents significant issues, due to the complex nature
of the data, which must be carefully considered before the decision
to present new genetic data to a jury is made. Given the complex
nature of genetic data and its potential to substantially confuse or
impact a jury's decision, it is essential that official guidelines be
promulgated in order to assist judges in their critical role as
gatekeepers and prevent evidence which could taint a jury's
analysis from being admitted.
Precautions must be taken to protect any genetic information
admitted into evidence and serious considerations of reliability,
relevance, and probative value must be taken into account before
genetic testing is admitted or compelled by the court. Finally,
courts must make strong efforts to stay abreast of the emerging
technology and any regulations involving genetic information in
order to safeguard against allowing premature information into the
courts, as well as to prevent skeptical research and data from being
used to prove or disprove a party's case.
199 Gold, supra note 32, at 404.
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